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Longitudinal Patterns of Centralization 
and Development: Testing Theories 
of Government Organization 
DALE KRANE 
In attempting to cope with the challenges of modernization, government 
officials are urged by specialists in development and comparative 
administration to manipulate the organization of public activity. 
Prescriptions for altering the public sector usually advocate one of two 
simple but contradictory options: centralization or decentralization. 
Adopting one or the other of these administrative arrangements reputedly 
yields important benefits which have system-wide impact on the course of 
development. 1 Unfortunately, no a priori principle exists to guide the choice 
between these sharply divergent alternatives. The present study was 
designed to compare the consequences of these organizational strategies in 
order to evaluate their utility as developmental courses of public action. 
The argument for centralization emphasizes its greater productive 
capabilities. Because centralization permits the extraction, coordination, and 
utilization of resources nationwide, a centralized government presumably 
can provide greater levels of public goods in contrast to a decentralized 
one.2 However, reliance on central coordination often results in a 
Dale Krane is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Mississippi State l lnin•rsity. 
The author would like to thank Professors Edwin Fogelman and Douglas Ashford for their 
helpful comments. 
1 Joseph LaPalombara, "Penetration: A Crisis of Government Capacity," in Crises anrl 
Sequences in Political Development, ed. Leonard Binder et aL (Princeton, !\iJ: Princl'lon 
University Press, 1971), pp. 205-32; ~!arion J. Levy, Jr., Moderni:.ation: Latecomers and 
Survivors (New York: Basic Books, 1972); Ted R. Curr, "Persistence and Change in Political 
Systems, 1800-1971," American Political Science Review 68 (December 1974): 1482-1504; Bruce 
M. Russett and R. Joseph Monsen, "Bureaucracy and Polyarchy as Predictors of PPrformance: A 
Cross-National Examination," Comparative Political Studies 8 (April 1975): 5-31. 
2 Jan Tinbergen, Central Planning (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964); Enunl'tt(' 
Redford, "Centralized and Decentralized· Political Impacts on a Developing Economy: 
Interpretations of American Experience" (Bloomington, IN: Comparatiw Administration 
Croup occasional paper, 1967); Yehezkel Dror, "Planning in the llnited States? Some Reactions 
by a Foreign Observer," Public Administration Review 31 (1\,lay-June 1971): 393-403: :-.Jarshall 
W. Meyer, Bureaucratic Structure and Authority: Coordination and Control in 254 Gor;emmcml 
Agencies (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). 
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standardization of public service provision which disregards individual and 
group preferences within the nation. This insensitivity to varying tastes 
hampers the greater experimentation, innovation, and responsiveness that 
supposedly derives from decentralized arrangements.3 
These trade-offs-between more responsiveness and less coordination, 
between more productivity and less public satisfaction-pose directly 
opposite hypotheses, as outlined in table 1. For example, both organizational 
prescriptions claim to foster economic growth. One guarantees productivity; 
the other promises efficiency. As for political development, each approach 
also points to the same desired end, but by different means. Centralization, it 
is argued, allows political leaders to impose the order necessary to 
coordinate development. Conversely, advocates of decentralization declare 
that only through dispersed decisionmaking can the allegiance necessary to 
political development be obtained. 
TABLE 1 
HYPOTHETICAL RELATIONSIDP OF CENTRALIZATION TO VARIOUS 
AsPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT 
Centralization associates positively 
with: 
economic growth 
production 
political development. 
stability 
Centralization associates negatively 
with: 
participation 
Decentralir,ation associates positively 
with: 
economic growth 
efficiency 
response 
regime support 
Decentralization associates negatively 
with: · 
coercion 
protest 
These competing propositions create a quandary for statesmen and 
scholars: which administrative recommendation should be followed? 
Escape from this prescriptive dilemma requires an approach which assists 
the public official in determining what form of national organization will 
facilitate development. This can be done by abandoning the arguments 
which link centralization or decentralization to development. Instead, the 
alternative formulated here stresses a choice between strategies of control 
over the allocation of societal resources to developmental tasks. Whether 
nation-builders opt for the construction of a centralized bureaucracy or the 
interaction of autonomous decisionmakers, they must ultimately establish an 
effective pattern of control over resource allocation. 
In using the mode of organization to govern development, national 
leaders can make adjustments in public action along three principal lines: (1) 
3 Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, The Political Basis of Economic Development 
(Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1966); Emil J. Sady, "Improvement of Local Government and 
Administration for Developmental Purposes," in Readings in Comparative Public 
Administration, ed. Nimrod Raphaeli (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 239-57; David Hart, 
"Theories of Government Related to Decentralization and Citizen Parti<;ipation," Public 
Administration Review 32 (October 1972): 603-21; Norman Furniss, 'The Practical Significance 
of Decentralization," Journal of Politics 36 (No\ember 1974): 958-82. 
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the internal structure of government, (2) the scope of public activity, and (3) 
the degree of resource commitment to a given substantive policy. 
Structure and scope have been and continue to be a source of controversy. 
Variations in the internal structure of government raise classic questions of 
unitary versus federal arrangements. Fluctuations in the size of the public 
domain likewise raise classic issues of socialism versus laissez-faire. The 
third dimension of public organization-substantive mix-can also be 
viewed as an important strategy of control. Changes in resource amounts 
devoted to a given program provide an organizational tool by which control 
can be exercised over national development.4 
But what becomes of centralization? Rather than retaining its 
conventional meaning, it can be transformed into an indicator of the pattern 
of control achieved in any of the public sector's organizational dimensions. 
In this study, changes in centralization-decentralization will chart shifts in 
the nature of public control over resource allocation accomplished through 
administrative adjustments in each dimension of public activity. 
Centralization, therefore, can occur through the augmentation of national 
control within the governmental structure, through the expansion of 
governmental action into new realms, or through the concentration of public 
resources in a particular policy area. 
Restating the above in a somewhat different fashion, the manner in which 
the public sector is organized selectively affects development. This means 
that as national leaders make modifications in the government's 
administrative structure, its scope, or its substantive policy mix, 
developmental progress in its economic, social, and political components 
will vary. By considering centralization-decentralization as a property of 
each organizational dimension, a more accurate reading of the adjustments 
made in the public sector can be obtained and the consequences of those 
changes can be analyzed. 
Analytic Procedure 
Studies of centralization reveal numerous alternative operational 
measures.5 Most of them break down in comparative and/or longitudinal 
research due to problems of cross-national equivalence or data availability. 
Expenditure-based measures of centralization possess the highest research 
utility because of their longitudinal extension and their flexibility, which 
facilitates rearrangement into comparable indicators despite differences in 
national accounting practices.6 
• Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries (New 
York: Wiley, Interscience, 1974); Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of 
Budgetary Processes (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975). 
5 Any catalogue of indicators of centralization would include: (1) formal constitutional 
pattern, (2) information flows, (3) geographic dispersion of activities, (4) form of decision-
making, (5) political party control, and (6) expenditure and personnel compensation patterns. 
6 Peter C. Sederberg, "National Expenditure as an Indicator of Political Change in Ghana," 
Journal of Developing Areas 7 (October 1972): 37-55; Douglas Ashford, "The Effects of Central 
Finance on the British Local Government System," British ]oumal of Political Science 4 (July 
1974): 305-22. 
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Centralization measures were constructed for each dimension of public 
organization-structure, scope, and substantive policy mix.7 Two ratios 
describe the distribution of policy control among levels of government. The 
first provides a basic comparison using all expenditures, while the second 
focuses solely on domestic activity. The public domain's size in respect to 
national output is employed as the fundamental measure of scope. In this 
study, two indices gauge changes in scope; the first utilizes national 
expenditure, while the other includes all governmental spending. The direct 
dichotomy between defense and other policy areas was chosen over more 
elaborate possibilities as a first analysis of substantive policy mix.8 
Just as with centralization, diverse indicators typify research on 
development. The chief problem is the selection of conceptually adequate 
measures from the many useful ones. A number of different theories state 
that development happens through a process of increasing the capability to 
produce desired outcomes and the engagement of the total society in the 
production and use of the outcomes.9 These outcomes have been defined by 
Needler as "the attainment of a mass participation polity, the promotion of 
economic development, and the establishment of a welfare state."10 Taken 
together, this syndrome identifies the crucial components of the dependent 
variable and considerably reduces the task of selecting appropriate 
measures. 
Economic growth is represented by three standard indices detailing 
changes in total national output, composition of the labor force, and 
production of steel. Social modernization outcomes are measured by 
7 The following expenditure ratios serve to measure the degree of centralization in each of the 
dimensions of public organization: 
l. Structure 
(a) National government expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure 
(NGE/TGE) 
(b) National government expenditure minus defense expenditure as a percentage of total 
government expenditure minus defense expenditure (NGE-Def.E/TGE-Def.E) 
2. Scope 
(a) National government expenditure as a percentage of gross national product 
(NGE/GNP) 
(b) Total government expenditure as a percentage of gross national product 
(TGE/GNP) 
3. Substantive mix 
Defense expenditure (including veterans' benefits) as a percentage of national 
government expenditure (Def.E/NGE) 
~ Public spending can also be disaggregated by ministries or collected into programmatic 
categories such as human resources, commercial development, general government, and 
national security. A project compiling ministerial spending on a comparative-longitudinal basis 
is being carried out by the author. 
9 Albert 0. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven, CT: YalP 
University Press, 1958); Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of Political Development," in 
Contemporary Political Analysis, ed. James C. Charlesworth (New York: Free Press, 1967), 
chap. 16; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and 
Politics," Comparative Politics 3 (April1971): 283-322; Robert P. Clark, Jr., Deoelopment and 
Instability: Political Change in the Non-Western World (Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1974). 
10 Martin C. Needler, Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and 
Evolutionary Change (New York: Random House, 1968}, p. 118. 
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increases in literacy and school enrollment as well as decreases in infant 
mortality.11 
While these conventional indicators of economic and social development 
can be applied in a straightforward fashion, determining "a mass 
participation polity" requires examining legitimate and illegitimate political 
behavior as well as obtaining some irlformation about constraints on 
participation. Status of the legislature and conditions of suffrage chart the 
possibility of institutionalized political participation. Two indices outlirle 
nonlegitimate opposition to the prevailing government and the level of 
TABLE 2 
SERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN STRUCTURAL CENTRALIZATION 
AND EcoNoMic GROWTH 
NGE 
TGE 
PATTERN 
I (Stable) 
France 
Italy 
Sweden 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Romania 
Peru 
II a (Linear increasing) 
United States 
Germany 
India 
III (Curvilinear) 
GNP 
.522* 
-.337 
.199 
- .658** 
- .491* 
.859**** 
.626** 
.947**** 
.929**** 
EcoNOMIC GROWTH 
Percentage 
Agriculture 
-.043 
-.140 
-.177 
.568* 
.896**** 
. 951*"** 
- . 802**** 
- .905**** 
. 953**** 
Steel 
Production 
-.197 
-.053 
.340 
- . 729*** 
- .751*** 
- .904**** 
.824**** 
.575* 
.881**** 
Japan .035 -.341 .293 
United Kingdom . 073 - . 332 . 363 
Norway . 308 - . 288 
Australia. .244 - .401 .456* 
Switzerland -.351 .161 
NoTE: Index of forecasting efficiency (E) (applies as well to tables 3-6): 
• 10% - 20% 
•• 21% - 30% 
*** 31% - 40% 
**** above 40% 
11 For economic and social development, the following indices are used: 
l. Economic growth 
(a) GNP 
(b) Percentage of the labor force employed in the primary sector (percentage 
agriculture) 
(c) Steel production 
2. Social modernization 
(a) Percentage of persons (usually oYer 14 years of age) able to read and write 
(percentage literate) 
(b) Number of children in primary schools (elementary education) 
(c) Deaths of children under 1 year of age per 1,000 live births (infant mortality) 
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domestic political violence. The last index, which may be the only indicator 
of political activity in some nations, measures the government's efforts to 
limit participation. 12 
The public expenditure data chosen for the centralization ratios were 
drawn from sources (see Appendix A) which can be termed "primary" in 
that the original data were either collected or reconstructed for use in 
scholarly or statistical exposition.13 The nations examined are Australia, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, 
Peru, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. While this set of countries in no way constitutes a technical sample of 
nation-states, it does include units with varying characteristics. For each 
nation, serial correlation coefficients have been calculated using average 
decade values (see Appendix B for the decade averages by country). 14 In 
arranging the analysis and interpretation of the serial correlations, nations 
were grouped according to their longitudinal pattern for each dimension of 
public sector organization. 15 
Longitudinal Analysis of Centralization and Development 
Because their political and even physical survival may depend on their 
choice, national leaders need to know what difference it makes if they adopt 
some adjustment in the government's operation. Despite the severe 
problems common to macrocomparative research, empirical evaluations of 
prevailing theories of government organization must be attempted if 
students of development hope to furnish useful information to public 
12 The data for political participation comes from the Minnesota Political Data Archive. 
Detailed descriptions of each measure are available from Professors William Flani!!:an and 
Edwin Fogelman, MPDA, University of Minnesota. 
13 Wolfgang Zapf and Peter Flora, "Some Problems of Time-Series Analysis in Research on 
Modernization," Social Science Information 10 (June 1971): 53-102. 
14 Instead of the usual F test of significance, which takes sample size into account, the index of 
forecasting efficiency was chosen. The computing formula can be found inN. M. Downie and 
R. W. Heath, Basic Statistical Methods, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Ro"''• 1965), pp. 223-26. 
1s To assign individual national expenditure series to empirically identifiable temporal 
patterns, the following parameters were established: 
l. Pattern I (stable over time) 
(a) range does not exceed 0.15 
(b) no inter-decade fluctuation to exceed .±0.15 
2. Pattern II a (linear increasing over time) 
(a) range exceeds 0.15 
(b) no inter-decade declines to exceed-0.10 
(c) contemporary value must exceed by +0.20 or more the earliest decade average 
3. Pattern lib (linear decreasing over time) 
(a) range exceeds 0.15 
(b) no inter-decade increases exceeding +0.10 
(c) contemporary value must be-0.20 or more in comparison to the earliest decade 
average. 
4. Pattern Ill (curvilinear over time) 
(a) range exceeds 0.15 
(b) series must exhibit at least one inter-decade increase of + 0.15 
(c) series must also exhibit at least one inter-decade decrease exceedin!!:-0.15. 
For a discussion of temporal pattern analysis, see Richard A. Pride, "PattNn Analysis: An 
Alternative Approach to Quantitative Historical Data," Comparative Political Studies 4 
(October 1971): 361-69. 
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officials. The following analysis explores the impact of temporal shifts in 
centralization on three basic aspects of development. 
Economic growth. Table 2 contains serial correlations between structural 
centralization (national government expenditure as a percentage of total 
government expenditure NGE/TGE) and economic growth. As predicted 
by the advocates of centralization, nations with linear increasing ratios 
(pattern Ila) display the strongest associations. Likewise, countries 
exhibiting structural variability (curvilinear pattern) yield a similar, but 
weaker relation with economic progress. Conversely, the results obtained 
with nations possessing relatively stable governmental structures (pattern I) 
suggest that they deviate from the centralization prescription. Theoretically, 
·these nations should have strong positive correlations with GNP and steel 
production. The negative signs directly contradict this proposition. The 
deviation becomes more striking with the discovery that this group of 
nations is characterized by very centralized governmental structures. 
From the above, it seems an impasse has been reached. Countries with 
increasing or variable patterns of national structure confirm the 
centralization viewpoint, while countries with relatively stable, highly 
centralized structures disconfirm it. Can this contradiction be resolved? 
Reconciliation of the correlational results with the two opposing models of 
government organization can begin with an examination of the current levels 
of centralization distinctive to the nations of pattern I in contrast to those of 
patterns Ila and III. Of the latter group, Australia, Germany, India, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States exhibit an almost equal distribution 
of government spending (especially when corrected for defense 
expenditure) between national and local governments during the 1960s.16 
Japan and Norway show approximately a two-thirds national to one-third 
local distribution. These differences point to the existence of two thresholds 
which stymie economic growth. Pattern I nations typify the upper limit. 
That is, a nation which spends the vast bulk of its public resources through 
its central government (0.75 plus) overburdens the country with a costly, 
rigid structure. At the other level, a nation which fails to erect a central 
organization (less than 0.30) will not be able to meet the shocks of economic 
growth like urbanization nor provide the social overhead capital essential to 
development. 
When the focus is moved to the size and substance of the public sector, the 
relationships between changes in scope and economic growth run counter to 
the expectations of the centralization strategy. Similar findings for the three 
patterns indicate that alterations in the proportional size of the public sector 
do not necessarily improve economic conditions. 17 On the other hand, 
substantive policy mix presents a clear connection with economic growth. 
Table 3 demonstrates that increasing defense outlays depress all three 
growth measures. This confirmation of the classic "guns versus butter" 
choice stands out sharpest in the negative correlations with steel production 
16 The respective NGE-Def.E/ TGE-Def.E scores are: Australia 0.50, Germany 0.59, India 
0.49, Japan 0.70, Norway 0.63, United Kingdom 0.57, and the United States 0.41. 
17 A set of tables listing the complete correlational results are available on request from tht• 
author. 
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and GNP for the pattern III nations. 18 Concentration of public resources into 
this single policy area thus brings about a most extensive and negative 
impact on economic growth. 
TABLE 3 
SERIAL CoRRELATIONs BETWEEN SUBsTANTIVE CENTRALIZATION 
AND EcoNOMIC GROWTH 
DEF. E 
NGE EcoNOMIC GRoWTH 
Percentage Steel 
PATTERN GNP Agriculture Production 
I (Stable) 
Brazil -.379 .140 - .823**** 
Peru .853 
Belgium .239 .707** .181 
Norway -.009 .182 
Sweden -.442 .219 -.268 
I Ib (Linear decreasing) 
India - .939**** - .872**** -. 959**** 
III (Curvilinear) 
United States .371 - .452* .443* 
Japan - .615h .882**** -. 712** 
Canada - .977**** .987**** - .991**** 
Australia -.165 .141 .257 
United Kingdom - .515* .634** - .558* 
Germany - .827**** . 901 **** - .675** 
France .131 - .077 .002 
Italy - . 878**** . 767*** - .817**** 
Romania .947**** - .939**** 
Switzerland .043 -.352 
Social modernization. Inspection of the temporal changes in public 
organization as they pertain to social modernization highlights the effect of 
scope. Modifications in the size of the public sector relative to national 
output directly condition the possibility of social advance. This is especially 
true when the results with total public scope are examined (see table 4). 
Increased total scope (signifying active subnational governments) generates 
substantial associations with the three modernization indices. If efforts at 
social improvement can be seen as a form of system responsiveness to 
citizen demands, then these findings support the decentralization 
prescription. 
IS Some might argue that Def.E/NGE is merely a proxy for international conflict and the 
depressant effect shown in table 3 can be explained by wartime situations. While this is a 
plausible counterproposition, it does not account for the correlations with Brazil, India, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. Of course, the proper test would be to factor out the war years and 
only rely on peacetime expenditure data for generating the correlations. Approximately one-
half of the possible data for both world wars is missing from the data set. This fact alone makes 
the correlations in table 3 even stronger as a test of substantive mix's effect. 
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TABLE 4 
SERIAL CoRRELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRALIZATION oF TOTAL GovERNMENT 
ScoPE AND SociAL MoDERNIZATION 
TGE 
GNP SociAL MoDERNIZATION 
Percentage Infant Elementary 
PATTERN Literate Mortality Education 
I (Stable) 
Australia .672** -.226 .383 
Brazil .952**** 
Peru .880**** 
India .990 -.983 .998 
II a (Linear increasing) 
United States .865**** -.899**** . 815**** 
Germany .475* - .994**** .441* 
Norway - .874**** .485* 
Sweden - .001 - .952**** .153 
III (Curvilinear) 
Japan - .547** . 748**** 
France .287 - .732*** -.337 
United Kingdom . 716*** -. 764*** -.084 
Italy . 757*** -.731*** .826**** 
Switzerland - .504* -.424 
Belgium .269 -.060 .377 
The other two organizational dimensions of public activity have little 
bearing on social progress. For structural centralization, the analysis 
tentatively hints that the developmental thresholds also operate in regard to 
social modernization, but this possibility still needs further testing. Only 
ambiguous and muddled correlations emerge between substantive policy 
mix and social development. It would appear, then, that of the three 
organizational dimensions only manipulation of the public sector's scope 
influences the course of social modernization. 
Political development. Propositions linking government organization and 
political development concentrate on issues of participation and 
suppression. Centralized polities are hypothesized to be nonparticipatory 
and more repressive. National behavior along the structural dimension of 
public activity (table 5) outlines a sharp dichotomy in the relation of 
centralization with legitimate versus illegitimate and suppressive politics. 19 
The absence of association between structural centralization and legitimate 
participation for Australia, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States is a reflection of the longevity of their formal participatory 
institutions. The other nine countries fall into two categories: (1) nations 
which have recently achieved functioning legislatures and/ or full and 
unrestricted suffrage, and (2) nations which have had difficulty maintaining 
representative assemblies and/or widespread electoral participation. More 
importantly, the appearance of two groups of nations- those with long, 
continuous histories of formalized political participation and those with 
19 For indicators of legitimate participation, low codes signify highly legitimate actions; on 
the other three indices, low codes denote an absence of illegitimate or suppressive actiou. 
NGE 
--
TGE 
PATTERN 
I (Stable) 
France 
Italy 
Sweden 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Romania 
Peru 
II a (Lir.ear increasing) 
United States 
Germany 
India 
III (Curvilinear) 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
Norway 
Australia 
Switzerland 
TABLE 5 
SERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN STRUCTURAL CENTRALIZATION AND 
POLITICAL pARTICIPATION 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Domestic 
Status of Non-legitimate Political 
Legislature Sufferage Participation Violence 
.381 .253 
.866 .. ** .343 .152 
.481* 
-.272 .703** -. 714** -.647 .. 
-.176 .800*** .819**** .114 
- .544* .169 - .662** 
-.169 .492* .477* 
.313 .381 
.564* .564* .339 .493* 
- .999**** 
- .999**** - .667** - .559* 
.811**** -.217 -.435 - .443* 
.556* .429 
.542* .542* 
.647** .448* 
- .639** -.376 
Political 
Suppression 
.355 
. 781*** 
.458* 
-.207 
-.087 
.298 
- .931**** 
- .305 
.593* 
- .999**** 
.369 
.542* 
.749*** 
-.376 
8 
~ 
:><: 
~ 
il 
TGE 
--
GNP 
PA'M'ERN 
I (Stable) 
Australia 
Brazil 
Peru 
India 
II a (Linear increasing) 
United States 
Germany 
Norway 
Sweden 
III (Curvilinear) 
Japan 
France 
United Kingdom 
I taly 
Switzerland 
Belgium 
TABLE 6 
SERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRALIZATION OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT 
ScOPE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Domestic 
Status of N on-le~timate Political 
Legislature Sufferage Participation Violence 
. 769*** . 774*** 
.362 - .830**** - . 743*** -.024 
- .856**** -. 707** - .640** 
.446* .446* . 776*** . 739*** 
.317 .483* 
.481* .481* .398 .539* 
.510* .509* 
-.481 ** 
.642** - .737*** .016 .009 
-.234 
-.129 
.334 .264 
-.279 -.029 
- .112 
- .206 
.654** -.295 -.301 -.223 
Political 
Supression 
t"" 
0 
.348 :1 §: 
.362 Q. 
- .985**** :r 1!. 
.446* 'C 
~ ;; 
~ 
-.405 :a. 
.513* () 
.509* " :1 
-.106 [. 
~~ g 
.479* 
" 
- .463* :1 Q. 
" ~ 
.205 
" 
- . . 206 § :; 
-.132 ~ 
~ 
"' 
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recent or unsuccessful experience-implies that the effect of structural 
centralization on legitimate political action is discontinuous. 
The indices of illegitimate and suppressive political behavior give support 
to the proposition that decentralized polities suffer less nonlegitimate and 
violent politics and that they resort less frequently to participation-
suppressive measures. Specifically, the correlations for the stable, highly 
centralized nations (pattern I) with illegitimate action are stronger than those 
for the other nations. In essence, this result bolsters the decentralization 
prescription and adds another bit of evidence to the threshold concept. 
Changing the organizational dimensions of public activity to scope (table 
6) essentially reproduces the direction, but not the strength, of association 
obtained with structure. The outstanding difference between structure and 
scope appears in the resQlts for nations with substantial variability in their 
public arrangements (pattern III). With structure, the expected positive 
association of increasing centralization and illegitimate behavior occurs. For 
scope, these same variables produce very weak correlations, suggesting 
declining regime opposition. Combining these two findings, one can 
speculate that expansion of public activity will not be opposed so long as the 
delivery systems remain reasonably decentralized. 
Instead of substantive mix's preeminent impact on economic growth or 
scope's effect on social modernization, the structure of public activity 
significantly contributes to the character of national political life. The 
clearest evidence derives from the differential results by pattern of public 
sector organization. These pattern-by-pattern differences outline a more 
complex relationship between public organization and national progress 
than assumed by the competing prescriptions. For example, pattern I 
nations that possess stable, centralized structures unlike those characteristic 
of nations with linear increasing or curvilinear trends display moderate to 
strong associations with illegitimate political participation.2° For scope, the 
pattern I nations feature comparatively small public sectors, but continually 
conflictual politics. This contrasts with pattern Ila nations which have 
enlarged the public sector's scope and have experienced declining 
expressions of opposition. For substantive policy mix, no consistent 
distinction between patterns was discerned. Therefore, on one hand, the 
correlational analysis of structural centralization and political development 
supports the decentralization prescription; but on the other hand, the results 
with the scope of public activity tend to confirm the centralization approach. 
So, in choosing between competing strategies for organizing the public 
sector, the analysis here leads to an impasse. To resolve it, it will be 
necessary to step back a bit from the tabular details and return to the original 
question. 
Public Sector Organization as a Developmental Tool 
That a political end can be reached by various administrative means is, by 
now, an old principle of political science. 21 In applying this axiom to the 
20 Switzerland with its decentralized "domestic" structure is the deviant case. Its strong 
correlations under nonlegitimate participation, domestic violence, and political suppression are 
connection to events during the decade of the 1940s. 
21 David M. Levitan, "Political Ends and Admmistrative Means," Public Administration 
Review 3 (Winter 1943) : 353-59. 
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pursuit of national development, some theorists have advised government 
officials that centralization of the public sector will promote progress, while 
others have asserted that development really follows from a decentralized 
polity. Rather than postulating in advance which prescription should be 
adopted, the approach used here accentuates the national leaders' efforts to 
exert control over societal resource allocation through manipulation of the 
government's structure, scope, and policy mix. As public officials vary their 
strategies of control, national development in its economic, social, and 
political aspects will be selectively modified. By transforming centralization-
decentralization into a behavioral property of each organizational 
dimension, a more detailed charting of administrative adjustments and their 
'impact can be obtained. 
Table 7 summarizes the correlational analysis by listing for each 
dimension of public organization that component of development most 
susceptible to shifts in centralization. Instead of one prescription or the other 
leading invariably to progress, changes in the degree of control within the 
public sector differentially condition developmental outcomes. Put another 
way, because changes in the degree of centralization in some areas of public 
activity have little or no relation with a given aspect of development, the 
empirical findings seriously undermine the basic advice of either the 
centralization or decentralization strategies. 
TABLE 7 
THE IMPAcr OF PuBuc ORGANIZATION ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF 
PuBLIC AcTIVITY 
Substantive mix 
Scope 
Structure 
ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT 
Economic growth 
Social modernization 
Political participation 
The significance of table 7 is the immediate frustration of any effort to 
choose between models of public organization. From the longitudinal results 
in all three developmental areas, the decentralization prescription receives 
some measure of support. It should be recalled that for economic growth, 
nations with high levels of spending on national defense constrained their 
economy's progress. Social modernization received an assist when total 
public scope increased. And for political development, nations with highly 
centralized public structures most often experienced nonlegitimate and 
violent political participation. While these findings add weight to the 
decentralization argument, others were discovered that preclude its 
uncritical acceptance. For example, nations which started with very low 
degrees of structural centralization and proceeded to moderate levels 
appear to have achieved substantial economic growth. Though increased 
activity by local jurisdictions. boosted social improvements, the sheer 
expansion of the national government also contributed to these 
improvements. And for political participation, the serial correlations point to 
those countries with small and unchanging scopes as being the least 
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developed politically. While these empirical discoveries demonstrate the 
analytic advantage gained by a multifaceted approach to public 
organization, they still leave the prescriptive quandary unresolved. 
Further study of the polity's organization and its impact on development 
will have to grapple with this dilemma. For example, the preliminary work 
here has identified a series of variable relations between different 
organizational formats and developmental outcomes which cast some doubt 
on previous administrative advice. From these seemingly contradictory 
results comes the importance of the developmental thresholds alluded to 
earlier. The possible existence of parameters governing the effect of 
different degrees of organizational control would mean that one could 
specify "the consequences of such variations (in administrative 
infrastructure) for productivity and/or about what productive effects could 
be achieved with marginal improvement."22 Thus, one could hypothesize 
that expanding the J?Ublic sector's size relative to national output may be 
very beneficial to transitional nations. It would spur social modernization 
and improve regime support. The longitudinal analysis verifies the efficacy 
of this advice and goes further to caution that an increase in scope should be 
composed of nondefense items and implemented on a decentralized basis 
(i.e., total public scope should increase). Solid confirmation of this tentative 
threshold finding would allow developmental practitioners to diagnose, and 
possibly direct with enhanced perception, needed organizational changes in 
the public sector. 
Designing a research strategy to identify and analyze these thresholds 
should produce considerable gain in terms of practical assistance to national 
leaders. Comparative and longitudinal expansion of the units under 
investigation is an obvious first step. A more complicated but rewarding task 
would be to disaggregate the independent variable within each 
organizational dimension. One may ask, for example, whether changes in 
the structure or scope of diverse public policies such as education or health 
provision sustain or constrain sectoral progress. Likewise, one may examine 
the developmental effect of public innovation, which is simply a change in 
substantive policy mix brought about by either the commencement of new 
activities or a reordering of previous priorities. 
Whatever the course of future research, its thrust must remain on the 
alternatives open to a nation and the consequences of the choices made. The 
concern cannot be with a single panacea, but must be with the "elasticity of 
control" in public organization.23 Government officials as they manipulate 
the dimensions of the public sector will differentially influence the course of 
development. Sensitivity in this manipulation can help avoid crises, or 
conversely, failure adequately to adjust public sector organization can lead 
to developmental traps. 
22 Warren F. Ilchman and Norman Thomas Uphoff, The Political Economy of Cha11ge 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 246. 
23 Herbert H Werlin, "Elasticity of Control: An Analysis of Decentralization," Journal of 
Comparative Administration 2 (August 1970): 185-209. 
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Appendix B: Public Expenditure Ratios: Average Decade Values by Country 
APPENDIX B TABLE 1 
AVERAGE DECADE RATIO OF NATIONAL TO TOTAL GOVERNMENT ExPENDITURE 
AU BE BR CA FR GE IN IT JA NO PE RO SD sz UK us 
1870 .809 .828 
1880 .789 .293 .741 .639 
1890 .806 .774 .339 .746 .667 .674 .593 .331 
1900 .812 .614 .758 .347 .735 .695 .632 .786 .568 .332 
1910 .468 .790 .639 .775 .353 .737 .652 .592 .656 .368 .759 .292 
1920 .362 .861 .583 .797 .479 .135 .763 .531 .531 .921 .956 .509 .336 .675 .341 
1930 .373 .783 .557 .719 .609 .125 .804 .710 .535 .929 .939 .531 .304 .635 .403 
1940 .758 .759 .547 .760 .827 .867 .907 .721 .945 .653 .566 .857 .692 
1950 .627 .736 .490 .623 .829 .623 .517 .743 .725 .664 .957 .878 .603 .352 .725 .609 
1960 .549 .736 .507 .556 .529 .729 .701 .675 .854 .619 .322 .645 .578 
NOTE: For Appendix B, tables 1-5, the following abbreviations apply: 
Australia: AU France : FR Japan: JA Sweden: SD 
Belgium: BE Germany: GE Norway: NO Switzerland: sz 
Brazil: BR India: IN Peru: PE United Kingdom: UK 
Canada: CA Italy: IT Romania: RO United States: us 
APPENDIX B TABLE 2 
AVERAGE DECADE RATIO OF NATIONAL TO TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, 
BOTH CoRRECTED FOR DEFENSE ExPENDITURE 
AU BE BR CA FR GE IN IT JA NO PE RO SD sz UK us. 
1R70 .756 .789 
1880 .739 .065 .682 
1890 .785 .714 .135 .693 .551 .442 .273 
1900 .796 .546 .691 .184 .691 .614 .761 .315 .173 
1910 .368 .772 .592 .672 .203 .656 .. 549 .492 .511 .510 .183 
1920 .349 .851 .529 .763 .460 .080 .756 .426 .504 .904 .945 .458 .289 .620 .337 
1930 .348 .763 .484 .631 .545 .081 .752 .669 .496 .911 .922 .470 .238 .562 .228 
1940 .590 .770 .461 .655 .742 .897 .705 .928 .541 .346 .735 .490 
1950 .659 .702 .419 .500 .774 .569 .455 .698 .618 .943 .865 .542 .262 .643 .389 
1960 .501 .715 .454 .475 .487 .710 .697 .633 .847 .573 .248 .575 .405 
APPENDIX B TABLE 3 
AVERAGE DECADE RATIO OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
TO GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
AU BE BR CA FR GE IN IT JA NO PE RO SD sz UK us 
1870 .129 
1880 .125 .029 .102 .027 
1890 .151 .045 .137 .067 .029 .057 .026 
1900 .140 .054 .133 .132 .096 .077 .026 
1910 .159 .138 .072 .127 .062 .157 .104 .088 .118 .257 .025 
1920 .127 .449 .079 .106 .302 .134 .032 .156 .104 .094 .097 .051 .172 .044 
1930 .086 .222 .069 .091 .245 .221 .041 .258 .564 .083 .065 .121 .072 .176 .094 1940 .275 .446 .100 .253 .199 .728 .224 .104 .143 .145 .517 .250 
1950 .179 .230 .100 .167 .284 .255 .094 .157 .377 .186 .114 .562 .202 .078 .285 .193 
1960 .228 .242 .113 .179 .165 .213 .321 .198 .608 .241 .081 .266 .201 
APPENDIX B TABLE 4 
AVERAGE DECADE RATIO TO TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
TO GRoss NATIONAL PRooucr 
AU BE BR CA FR GE IN IT JA NO PE RO SD sz UK us 
1870 .159 
1880 .157 .100 .139 .042 
1890 .196 .132 .184 .095 .043 .096 .079 
1900 .182 .157 .181 .181 .153 . 134 .079 
1910 .314 .175 .114 .170 .177 .213 .155 .148 .177 .302 .085 
1920 .320 .499 .136 .381 .279 .230 .197 .186 .177 . 191 .143 .253 .128 
1930 .230 .287 . 181 .343 .362 .332 .346 .696 .155 .069 .225 .207 .276 .232 
1940 .349 .541 .192 .465 .237 .827 .311 .110 .242 .343 .595 .338 
1950 .287 .314 .210 .268 .341 .410 .188 .228 .514 .280 .119 .639 .334 .227 .393 .312 
1960 .321 .328 .222 .322 .278 .293 .458 .293 .717 .390 .251 .413 .347 
APPENDIX B TABLE 5 
AVERAGE DECADE RATIO OF DEFENSE EXP£N!>ITURE TO 
NATIONAL GoVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
AU BE BR CA FR GE IN IT JA NO PE RO SD sz UK us 
1870 .272 . 221 
1880 .239 .832 .250 
1890 . 122 .269 .695 .233 .378 
.458 .239 1900 .095 .244 .286 .576 .194 .294 .132 .638 .580 1910 . .369 .101 .182 .398 .532 .318 .350 .278 . 275 .719 .459 1920 .055 .082 .194 .085 .179 .077 .439 .195 .341 .103 .203 .188 .186 .200 .218 .196 1930 .104 .108 .254 .043 .204 .227 .378 .252 .173 .140 .219 .244 .203 .273 .226 .365 1940 .514 . 100 .292 .419 .282 .090 .073 .256 .358 .436 .271 .579 1950 .188 .156 .273 .394 .292 .198 .228 .048 . 182 .284 .123 .219 .353 .317 .600 1960 .182 .100 .190 .277 .175 .037 .031 .170 .051 .173 .306 .255 .504 
